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Local area networks (LANs) are a fairly recent
development in the history of computers. A LAN is comprised
of a set of workstations and personal computers connected
together by a communications system, and is designed to allow
file sharing, large file space, and the efficient sharing of
system resources. In the academic and research worlds, the
high performance of computer systems is required. It is,
therefore, natural that efficient LAN technology has become
very popular in both of these domains.
This thesis examines and evaluates three network systems,
each developed with high performance in mind. The Amoeba,
Andrew /Coda, and V s ys terns are compared to a Unix network
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running Sun NFS (Network File Service) which is now widely in
use in the academic and research fields. These three networks
were chosen because, in some cases, they have different
approaches to solving similar problems which afflict networks
in general. Each network is examined in several different
areas. The specific areas of scrutiny (Distributed File
Service, Distributed Directory Service, Security, Failure
Tolerance. RPC Mechanisms, Scalability, and Process
Management) were chosen to illustrate some of those different
design approaches.
In a complex system, each decision made in the design of
1
a feature has ramifications, which can be both positive and
negative, on the operation of the entire system. The choices
made in the design of the three surveyed networks will be




Advances in hardware and software technology have made
great strides in the last twenty years. Many workstations and
some personal computers now have more computing power than
mainframe computers of two decades ago; these changes have
allowed designers to configure computers in ways once unimag-
inable. One of the configurations gaining popularity is that
of the LAN (Local Area Network).
A LAN, as depicted in figure 1, is characterized by a
number of computers, usually workstations and/or personal
computers, connected together by a hardware communications
network. The LAN runs a software package which allows the
diverse machines to communicate with one another, usually for
the express purpose of sharing files and data.
LANs are quickly taking the place of time-sharing
computer systems in research and academic applications. There
are several good reasons for this evolution. The wait for a
time-share computer to respond to an interactive command is a
function of the loading on the machine (the number of users
and the type of applications they are running); often that
wait is a long one. Many of the newest graphics and windowing
programs are difficult or even impossible to run on a time-
share system; the screen update time is too long due to the
3
communication lag time from terminal to computer and back.
Certainly not to be overlooked is that the cost of a LAN can
be well below the cost of a comparable time-share instal-
lation.









Figure 1 General Local Area Netflork
Early LAN designs did not solve all of the problems which
were caused by this evolution in computing. LANs were often
slow and unreliable. Excess loading often caused delays in
procuring files from servers and sometimes caused messages to
get lost causing erratic operation. During the eighties and
accelerating into the nineties, many different research
projects have sought answers to the technical problems which
have plagued LAN technology. These problems can be grouped
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into several areas: scalability (the ability to add additional
nodes without loading down the system inordinately), speed of
communication between servers and clients, server and oper-
ating system failures, and, in general, the high overhead
necessary to run a network.
This thes is will examine three of the; networks which have
"
been designed in an attempt to address some of these problems.
This thesis is not meant to be an exhaustive survey of every
network which has been implemented or theorized. Instead, it
will examine several networks for which designers have used
innovative thinking and engineering to solve the problems
cited. Not every network has solved every problem; it may
well be that the best design will an amalgam of the many ideas
herein.
The baseline system which will be compared with these
newer networks will be a Unix based network incorporating the
Sun NFS (Network File System) and connected over a physical
communications network. The connected workstations and lor
personal computers could be of many different makes and con-
figurations. The term Sun NFS is not meant to refer to a
specific system; it is meant to represent a very common class
of network now in use on many university campuses and research
labs. For two of the networks surveyed, this type of system
was the starting point for the researchers.
5
Not every network researched had substantially disparate
ways of handling each topic above; therefore, only the in-
novative differences will be highlighted.
The basic characteristics of networks will be examined in
Chapter 2, and a short overview of the specific surveyed
networks will be given in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the
distributed file systems for these networks will be examined,
followed by an exposition of network directory services in
Chapter 5. Network security features will be explored in
Chapter 6, followed by a review of the ability of the networks
to tolerate failures in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 will examine the





by process management in
will summarize and draw
conclusions about the three networks surveyed.
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2. NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS
The perfect network would combine all of the desirable
features of a time-share mainframe with the convenient
features of personal workstations and have none of their
shortcomings. To date, this perfect model has yet to be been
attained. As in most engineering fields, network design takes
into account both cost and performance and tries to build a
system with the best ratio of the two. As always, when this
type of compromise is made, there are innate technical
shortcomings built into the system. As technology advances,
changes to ameliorate these imperfections can be effected
without inordinate cost. The field, therefore, is constantly
advancing towards the ultimate network which matches the
ideals above. The innovations in various networks as recorded
by this thes is should be seen as an attempt to reach this
goal.
For this thesis, a network is deemed to be set of
independent processors (typically personal computers or
workstations but possibly including minis or mainframes) which
are connected together by a physical communications system.
It implies a software package (or packages) designed to let
the nodes (each individual computer) communicate with each
other over the communications system. Usually, though not
always, each node has its own operating system, which, if the
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node were disconnected from the network, would allow that
computer to operate autonomous ly. In addition, there is
network software resident in the node to facilitate connec-
tions with the network. The system is considered a Local Area
Network rather than a WAN (Wide Area Network) or an Internet-
work (combination of LANs into a WAN), both of which have
inherently different problems. It should be noted in certain
cases, however, the line between LAN, WAN and Internet is very
thin.
The actual communication paths between the nodes will not
be investigated here. Most of the LANs surveyed have been
implemented us ing a 3 Mbi t or 10 Mbi t Ethernet. In most
cases, a token ring network could have been used just as well.
Over the years, these have been the two most common com-
munication systems used in LANs. 1 The actual details of
their implementations are not germane to the discussion. The
author will assume that the protocols and hardware used in the
communication paths will not affect the actual workings of the
network in question (unless the network designer claims that
they do). When a message is sent from one node to another,
the inter-working of various processes necessary to the
connection will be accepted as happening behind the scenes.
The abstraction will be such that one node sends the message
and the other receives it in the form sent. Data marshalling
(putting procedure arguments in a form for transmission),
parameter building. message protocols, addressing and related
8
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issues will all be abstracted away unless it is essential to
the concept of the LAN under question.
As noted above, most of the systems under study have used
an Ethernet for their communications path, but none claim that
it affected their des ign. This choice may change as new
technologies emerge, especially the fiber-optics revolution
which could speed up networks by several factors of magnitude.
Since speed of remote communication is one of the main goals
of these systems, fiber optic communication will likely allow
these systems to rival local bus systems for speed one day.
Although being compared to a Unix based network system,
not all of the networks researched are based on the Unix
operating system. The designers of the Amoeba network view
the Unix environment as unnecessarily stringent. 2 Two of the
networks allow machines running disparate operating systems to
connect into the network and receive the benef it of the
system, an obvious step towards the ideal network.
2.2 Network Features
While there are many possible viewpoints and opinions on
the features which a network should contain, it is generally
accepted that the following characteristics are desirable:
Transparency: the concealment from the user of the
interconnections necessary for the network. To the user, it
should appear as if all of the network functions are a normal
9
part of the workstation or computer being used. There are
eight forms of transparency desirable:
o Access Transparency. Files and other objects should all
be accessed the same, whether remote or local.
Location Transparency. All objects should be able to be
accessed without knowledge of their exact location.
Concurrency Transparency. Multiple users or applications
should be able to operate concurrently on the same data
without mutual interference.
Replication Transparency.
and other data should be
Multiple instances of files
available to increase reli-
ability and performance; the users need not be aware that
the data is duplicated.
Failure Transparency: Failure in one part of the network
should not affect performance of the rest of the network;
failures should be localized.
Migration Transparency: Objects and files should be free
to be placed anywhere within the network without affec-
ting the performance of the system.
Performance Transparency. Changes in the network should
be able to be performed without affecting users on the
system.
Scaling Transparency. The system and the applications
that it runs should be able to expand in scale without




Scalability: the ability to add additional nodes without
appreciable degradation of the service.
Resource Sharin~ the ability to use the same resources
rather than replicating each resource at each node (i. e.
network printers.)
Security users (and the network itself) should be
protected from security breaches either accidental or mali-
cious.
Fault Tolerance: the failure of a single node or object
should not affect other nodes or objects.
Failure Recovery the recovery of the network after a
failure should be rapid and automatic, not relying on users to
actively participate.
Flexibility: ideally, the user should not be penalized
for the shortcomings of the workstation that (s)he is using,
especially the processor limitations. a
While none of the surveyed systems exhibit all of these
desirable characteristics, in many cases they have been
improved when compared to the standard Unix system.
improvements will be documented in this thesis.
These
a Two of the surveyed systems actually allowed the
user's program to be computed by processor(s) other than the
user's own. This feature is cons ide red by the author to be
extremely important to the concept of an ideal network; it
would allow much heavier computational loads to be undertaken
by a user without requiring that the user be working at a
workstation capable of handling such loads. Parallelization,
with all of the attendant advantages, is inherently supported
in this type system.
11
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2.3 Client / Server Paradigm
One of the concepts which will continually appear in this
thesis (since it is a basis of most network function calls) is
the notion of a server/client relationship which is illus-




Figure 2 Client / Server Nodel
A client is a process which sends a message to another
process (usually located on a second node) asking it to
perform a particular service. The server is a process which
accepts the message from the client, performs the task, and
returns the results to the client. The server abstracts the
actual representation of the resource that it manages into a
12
simple request/reply process (denoted 'l?Y heavy arrow in figure
2) .
Servers can be divided into two basic types:
Iterati ve server: a request can be handled in a short
time (the duration already known to the server). The
server itself handles the request.
Concurrent server: duration of service depends on the
request and cannot be determined ahead of time by the
server. The request can be handled in one of two ways:
it can be transferred to another, already existing,
process for service, or the server can fork off (create)
another process specifically to service the request. In
either case, once the request is transferred, the server
blocks again waiting for another incoming request.
The following is a typical sequence of operations in a
client / server relationship:
(1) The server process opens a communication channel and
informs the local host of its willingness to accept
client requests on some well known address.
(2) Wait for a client request to arrive at the well known
address.
(3) For an iterative server, process the request and send the
reply. For a concurrent server, a new process is spawned
to handle the client request. This requires a "fork" and
possibly an "exec" under Unix, to start the new process.
The new process then handles the client's request. It
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does not respond to other client requests; it is specific
to the request which caused it to be spawned. When this
new process is finished, it closes its communication
channel with the client, and terminates.
(4) Go back to step 2 and wait for another client request.
The client process performs a different set of actions:
(1) Open a communication channel and connect to a specific
well-known address on a specific host (i.e. the server).
(2) Send service request messages to the server, and receive
the responses. Continue doing this as long as necessary.
(3) Close the communication channel and terminate. 5
14
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A brief overview of each of the surveyed networks will be
given in this section. Detailing of the distinctive features
will be presented in subsequent chapters.
3.1 Amoeba
Amoe ba is des igned to emulate the actions of a single
powerful time-sharing computer. The system is designed to be
implemented on a number of machines which, potentially, could
be distributed among several countries. It was originally
designed and built at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. It
is now being jointly developed there and at the Centrum voor
Wiskunde en Informatica, also in Amsterdam. S
In this des ign, users would not know, nor
matter, where in the system their program is
running. The operating system dynamically
even multiple processors to run their jobs. Parallelization
of algorithms is automatically done by special compilers so
that available processors are best utilized. The Amoeba
system is innately tied to the Object Oriented paradigm. All
data and hardware entities are considered objects, for which
certain defined operations are available. This scheme is
15
necessary for the security system built into the network, and
will be explained below.
The hardware for Amoeba, which consists of four main
parts: workstations (usually diskless), pool processors,












Processor Pool Specialized Servers
Gateway
Figure 3 Typical Al:oeba Rtf Installation
Workstations act as intelligent terminals. The local
processor does not literally run the users' programs per se;
its job is to handle the processes that need faster reaction
time than the network can supply. Examples of these processes
include cad/cam front ends, windowing packages and other gra-
phics intensive jobs, and command interpreters. Possible
terminal types include Sun-3s. VAXstations, and X-terminals.
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User applications are physically executed on the pool
processors. These processors are typically single board
computers with a network interface and several Mbytes of non-
s hared memory on board. Presently in use are VME based
computers using 68020 and 68030 CPUs. While these processors
can be run in parallel, they can also be multi-programmed if
desired. Ideally, the number of processors should exceed the
number of users by an order of magnitude. Because the
processors are dealt with dynamically by the operating system,
the absolute number of processors can change at any time. 7
The specialized servers are typically workstations with
large disk systems which provide dedicated services to the
network, including directory, file, database and boot servers.
In some cases, the servers are replicated to provide more
fault tolerance in the system.
Finally, the gateways are used to connect the Amoeba LAN
to other Amoeba LANs to form a quasi-WAN. As these gateways
are an integral part of the design, wide area services are
much more functional than is the case with many other net-
works. In effect the various LANs form a single uniform
system, a super LAN.
The philosophy of Amoeba· s des igners is to provide a
large number of processors to each user. If poss i ble, the
number should be the maximum needed for the most efficient
parallelization of the program to be run. By pooling proces-




enhanced. The designers have abstracted the idea of processor
capability and made the processor pool into a processor server
much the same as a file server. 8
The Amoeba operating system kernel is small (as compared
to other multi-process ing operating systems such as U'nix). It
supervises memory management, process creation, migration,
debugging, checkpointing and destruction. It also handles
inter-process communication tasks. 9 Most other services
which would normally be included in the operating system
kernel, such as the directory service, are provided by user
level services. This scheme to put as much of the opera-
ting system into user space as possible -- helps achieve a
flexible system without sacrificing performance.
A conscious decision was made not to implement Amoeba
with an already available operating system. The designers
felt that such a move would institutionalize the inefficien-
cies which they saw in those systems. Currently, the desig-
ners are in the process of implementing most Unix functions on
top of Amoeba due to the popularity of that operating system.
The actual implementation of the calls is markedly different,
but the abstraction is useful for porting available code to
the Amoeba system.
18
3.2 iJndref1 / Coda
Originally designed in 1983, the Andrew system has gone
through several incarnations. Designed and installed at
Carnegie-Mellon University, the Andrew system has two stated
imperatives: scalability and security. Eventually, CMU plans
on the installation of a network with 5,000 to 10,000 nodes to
be used by all University students. The scalability factor is
thus extremely important. Most networks start to have over-
load problems with far fewer connections. Likewise , with that
many links, system integrity and security must be designed
from the ground up to be truly effective.
Andrew takes a far different approach to networking than
does the Amoeba system. CPU cycles for the users are supplied
by their own workstations; as much of the network software as
possible also runs on those same processors. The credo of the
designers is to make the user's processor take on as much of
,-
)
the network's computing load as possible. This strategy frees
up the network's dedicated machines to allow a greater
scalability factor without overload problems. In addition,
having fewer dedicated machines on the network (for the same
number of users) makes it easier to protect the machines from
securi ty attacks. The only functions that the dedicated
servers actually perform are those needed for security, system






Figure 4 Typical Andrei System H~
As can be seen in figure 4, the dedicated machines and
the physical communications hardware are collectively called
Vice; each workstation runs a process called Venus. Together,
Venus and Vice cooperate to connect all of the workstations
into a single LAN.
The declared benefits over other LANs:
Data sharing is simplified, since all files that a user
is entitled to use are (effectively) on any workstation.
Similarly, files can be moved by administrators to any
server with no ill effect upon the users of the files.
~ User mobility is enhanced for the same reasons.
~ System administration is easier. The sys-ops (system
operators) are concerned only about the relatively small
number of dedicated servers and are able to leave the
workstations to the actual owners I users. Adding a new
20
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workstation consists of connecting it physically to the
network and assigning it a network address.
Tighter security: only the servers which make up Vice
need be physically secure. User level programs never run
on the servers so they cannot be corrupted by outside
software. Encryption based authentication and transmis-
sion enforces the security of the servers.
Because the network uses workstation disks only as
caches, the workstations can be relocated or turned off
without affecting any other users (a big improvement over
NFS which may use a local node's disk as a server for the
files physically on the disk). 11
From the start, the file server was based on the Unix
model. Already widely used, Unix is viewed by the Andrew
designers as an ideal operating system for sharing data in
both academic and research areas. 12
The user's workstations must have hard disks (as compared
to the Amoeba and V approach which allows diskless worksta-
tions.) These disks are used as file caches for the users.
Whole file transfers (as in Amoeba) lower the amount of com-
munication traffic necessary on the system. Other design
characteristics include the "read only" replication of files
which are rarely written to (such as executables), the
reduction of communication traffic between server processes by
not requiring that they keep universal knowledge about the




to heighten security, and the batch transmission of messages
whenever possible.
3.3 V System
The V distributed processing system has been under design
at Stanford Univers i ty in California for several years.
Conceptually, the V system can be thought of as an attempt to
emulate a multi-processor computer (as compared to Amoeba and
Andrew which strive to appear as time-share computers). In
keeping with the metaphor of a single multiprocessor computer,
the operating system kernel is distributed throughout the
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Figure 5 Conceptual Design of V Sys tern
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The kernel can be thought of (abstractly) as a bus; much
like a hardware bus, it is mainly responsible for communi-
cation between the nodes (conceptually shown in figure 5). It
supplies "slots" for user level processes to be inserted into,
the same way that a bus supports expansion slots for circuit
boards. The bus (distributed kernel) then acts as the primary
controller between the individual slots and the outside
world. 13 The kernel supports a program environment of many
lightweight threads b of control, all communicating by mes-
sages. These threads are mainly configured as server proces-
ses. Because the threads are lightweight, the context switch
time is very small reducing the overhead of server implemen-
tation.
V is designed chiefly using the server / client paradigm,
even more so than Amoeba and Andrew. Tasks that are con-
sidered part of the kernel in virtually every other network
are performed by separate server processes in the V system.
One of the reasons for this is that V is, mos t of all, a
system that was designed for research rather than for full
commercial use. This is not to say that V is not a utili-
tarian system; indeed, it is used every day at Stanford. It
is, however, designed so that technical problems and design
b A lightweight process in V is defined as an individual
flow of control, its associated registers and private stack.
This concept will be developed more fully below.
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errors can be rapidly corrected and re-implemented. This
mandates modular design be used as much as possible.
There are three main tenets in the basic philosophy of
the implementation of V. First is the belief that high
performance communication is the most critical need of a
distributed system. The ability to move large amounts of data
over the communication lines as quickly as possible is the
main bottleneck of distributed systems. Poor performance of
the communication system leads to high overhead in an effort
to get every bit of performance possible out of the system.
Secondly, the designers believe that protocols, and not
software, define the system. Any type of operating system or
computer, no matter the underlying architecture, can operate
on a network if it follows the requisite protocols for the
exchange of information. The optimal, therefore, is to design
the protocols for maximum efficiency, functionality, relia-
bili ty and security. The software which adheres to those
protocols will give the best performance.
The last tenet is to keep the design of the kernel small.
The kernel should implement the protocols and services at the
minimum size required. It should provide a transparent
interface with the communications system. A process sending
a message should not need to know where the requested service
is located. The kernel should abstract away all communication
details; a process should be totally unaware of any connec-
tivity topics. 14
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The design of V owes much to the architecture of multi-
processor machines. The most efficient way for multiple
processors to handle shared state information is by use of
shared memory. In a distributed environment, there is no
shared address space so there can be no real shared memory.
However, if the communication overhead can be managed, virtual
shared address space is possible. The common problem with
shared space which is replicated (i. e. memory caches in
multiple processor computers) is keeping them coherent and
consistent with each other. If a byte is changed in one
cache, that change must be propagated to all of the versions
of that particular line of memory in all of the caches.
The designers have used much the same [cache] rational in
the design of V. Data is manipulated in blocks called pages
(as compared to the standard Unix block, a byte). These
virtual memory pages are transferred by a highly efficient
block transport scheme from node to node. Consistency is then
handled by the protocols which are less expensive than
conventional consistency strategies to permit what the
designers call problem oriented shared memory.
This brief overview on these three networks will be
expanded in the chapters to come. Each system will be
examined in greater detail and compared against a generalized
network as already illustrated.
25
4. DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEM
In the attempt to replace the time share / mainframe
paradigm, there is no more important component of a network
than the file service. As already stated above, the best
reason to connect computers into a network topology is to
allow the sharing of information. In a perfect world, a
network would be able to give the illusion to each user that
the entire network file system is physically present on
his/her machine. While no system yet totally attains this
ideal, each of the networks surveyed gets closer than does the
NFS system. A quick exposition of the NFS system will lead to
the examination of different approaches to file systems as
implemented in the three surveyed networks.
Virtually all of the communication over the LAN is con-
nected in one way or another with the transfer of files. The
distributed file service is needed to support shared infor-
mation, to enable users to access remote files regardless of
where they are located on the system. If diskless work-
stations are used, a file system is needed for all permanent
data storage. It makes a major contribution to the trans-
parency of the system because it offers a single integrated
service accessible to users at every workstation. 15
Information which the network is designed to disseminate
is contained in the files of the network.
26
Without a way of
handling the files efficiently, there is little reason to have
a network. The file distribution abstraction should be as
transparent as possible. Ideally, the user should appear to
have a directory structure which can be accessed as if it
resided on the local hard disk. All of the files and execu-
tables for which the user is authorized should be available;
any for which (s)he is not authorized should not be visible or
obtainable. The location of the files should not be a burden
to the user. That is, the failure of a particular server
should not cause the non-availability of desired files. Files
should be replicated as necessary to prevent inconvenience to
the users.
4.2 Sun NFS
The Sun NFS (hereafter to be called simply NFS) was
introduced by Sun Microsystems in 1984. The Sun NFS is the
most widely used distributed file service at the present time.
Now in use in over 100,000 computers, this file service was
des igned to be both operating system and machine type indepen-
dent 16 .
Before the introduction of NFS, information sharing on a
LAN was performed in one of two ways: duplication of needed
files on all machines, a wasteful and expensive practice, and
the attempt at a large monolithic operating system running
over the entire network, an expensive and ultimately non-
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feasible method. The NFS allows the file systems of remote
computers to appear as if they were local to a user's own
computer. While designed to be operating system independent,
it is most closely aligned for use with the Unix operating
system.
At various times, an individual computer can be both
client and server for the NFS. If the computer has a hard
disk, it can supply files to remote nodes as a server. When
needed by the local user, it can import files for local use in
a client capacity. To allow NFS to remain platform indepen-
dent, it uses RPC (Remote Procedure Call) mechanisms to access
remote files and perform the necessary work. The entire NFS
can be conceptually thought of as a library of remote pro-
cedure calls which manipulates remote files and directories.
Each RPC contains all of the information necessary to
complete the requested action; the service does not keep a
running account of the operations as they execute. In case of
a system crash, there are no intermediate states that the
machine would need to recover from. If the call returned a
value before the crash, then it was finished. If not, after~
the recovery from the crash, the RPC needs only to be called
again.
Most implementations of NFS make use of the UDP (User
Datagram Protocol). [See section on RPCs below.] UDP is a
communication protocol designed to transfer relatively small
amounts of data (up to 9 kbits) very quickly17. Known as an
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unreliable protocol because there is no guarantee that a
message will be delivered, the low overhead associated with
this protocol, the speed of communication, the rarity of
crashes, and the ease of crash recovery all combine to make
this trade-off acceptable. As long as Unix communication
device drivers are supplied, virtually any.kind of network
operating system can use the NFS. Both LAN and WAN con-
figurations are supported; direct support is available for
both token ring and Ethernet configurations.
The overhead of both the NFS and the RPCs that support it
is very little over and above that required by the Unix
operating system. The NFS server is typically a very fast
machine with a large amount of available disk space. This
machine could range from a fast 386 computer to a large
mainframe, depending on the network configuration.
4.2.2 NFS Design
NFS was designed to make the networked file system look
as much like the standard Unix file system as possible. This
was performed by separating the file system interface from the
file system implementation. The interface is called the
VFS/VFN (Virtual File System / Virtual File Node) interface.
This interface is kept at a high level of abstraction in the
operating system kernel so that the file system is as trans-
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parent as possible to the user and to the applications which
access it.
All system calls appear to perform the same services as
they do in non-networked Unix. The implementations of the
calls is, of course, vastly different. The actual mani-
pulation of the remote data structures is by the RPCs within
the actual file systems which phys ically house the structures.
The major tasks of NFS are exporting file systems and
mounting file systems. To export a file system is to notify
other nodes on the network of the availability of a specific
file system for mounting. When a server boots up, it notifies
the Unix kernel as to which files it is willing to export.
When a client system boots up and connects to the network, it
requests access to the file systems that have been specified
by its user (in a file called /etc/fstab) by running the mount
command. The server daemon running on the server determines
the availability to the client (is it physically available and
is the client allowed to access those files?). If the daemon
determines that the answer is yes, the server passes a file
handle back to the client. The client stores the handle in a
structure called a VNODE and the NFS creates a matching RNODE.
The VNODE makes the local system aware that the file
system mounted is actually an NFS structure and not physically
present in the local system. The file system available to the
node is now called a Virtual File System since not all files
are physically present. When a file operation is desired, the
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user simply makes the standard call for that operation. The
RNODE's data structure contains data on the state of the files
mounted. The operation requested is intercepted by the VFS
and, us ing the data available in the VNODE and RNODE, the
correct RPCs are directed to contact the server and obtain the
requested service(s).
The file handle allows access to the files in the mounted
file system in an abstract manner, since the actual represen-
tation of the file on the remote server may be very different
from that of the requesting client. This abstraction allows
the NFS to operate among many different platforms. The mount
command maps the directory structure into one specific
subdirectory for the client machine. If it is not a Unix
machine, the mount is written specifically for the machine's
representation needs.
File storage is machine dependent with NFS. There is no
particular protocol necessary, since NFS will translate the
files to the required format when it sends them to a client.
For this reason, the time required for a file operation is
exactly the time for the file access on the remote machine
plus the overhead of the packaging and transporting of the
file to the remote location. This is one of the areas in
which researchers have concentrated their efforts, since the
standard file operations are inherently slow.
It is important to stress that files are stored and
accessed on the physical machine exactly as if the machine
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were not networked. The file storage and access schemes have
not been modified to increase performance. This results in
major cause of performance degradation compared to some of the
other schemes studied.
At high loads, the Sun NFS has a tendency to fail on some
file functions. This is because some packets may get lost at
times of high communication traffic. Should they get lost,
the data which they h~ld is lost and, after the timeout in the
caller expires, the call fails.
In the coming sections, different approaches to solving
the problems of distributed file systems will be examined. In
each case, the performance of the file systems compares
favorably to that of NFS. The reasons for the performance
improvements will be explained.
4. 3 Amoeba File Server
One of the most innovative features of the Amoeba network
is the file server with which it has been equipped. The
service has been named the Bullet Server (as in .. faster than
a speeding bullet."); it can send data to remote locations
continuously at 783 kbytes / second. 18
The bullet server was designed to remove the bottlenecks
caused by other file servers which were designed for lower
performance use. Tradi tional file servers are devised to
support large files using as few resources as possible. Since
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files can be appended or edited, they are divided into blocks
to be put on disk. These blocks can be dynamically allocated
to any portion of the disk for storage. While this strategy
allows easier changes to the file, there is a very high cost.
Since each block has to be independently sought, access speed
suffers. Also, since there can be an indeterminate number of
blocks making up a single file, extra blocks have to be
allocated to supply pointers to the blocks. For very large
files, chains of pointers to blocks may be necessary. If each
block of pointers must be brought in from disk to get to the
next set of pointers, a long access time ensues.
This storage paradigm, designed when disks were small, is
no longer defensible with improved technology and hardware.
Today's huge fast disks can support some space inefficiencies
to allow faster access. The bullet server is des igned to
overcome the shortcomings of the file / block storage scheme.
In the bullet server, files are contiguously stored on the
disk. There is no block partitioning to slow down the access
process. Once the disk head is positioned over the starting
cluster of the file, it reads linearly until the entire file
is in memory. The disk directory needs but one entry for the
file, no matter the size.
33
4.3.2 File Representation in Amoeba
This method of access would not be efficient nor desir-
able if the same operations available on other file servers
were to be allowed. Modifying a section in the middle of the
file could cause a problem with writing it back to the disk.
If the number of clusters used increased, the file might not
fit in the same location anymore. This was not a problem in
the old paradigm; another block was simply allocated and
another pointer was added to the inode.
Amoeba solves this dilemma by making all files immutable
(unchangeable). When a file is modified, the old version is
deleted and a totally new version is stored on the disk
perhaps in the same place, perhaps not. [In reality} the old
one may still be saved. It depends on the algorithm used for
version control on writes. ] One consequence of this strategy
is that a processor can only operate on a file which fits
totally in memory, since the file must be moved as a whole.
There are some applications for which this immutability
is a problem. Large data bases would need to be totally re-
written to file every time a single datum was changed, for
example. Each addendum to a log file would require the entire
file to be copied over. These would add greatly to the
overhead (the elimination of which was the reason for
changing the paradigm in the firs t place). These special
cases are each considered individually. Data bases are
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generally split into many smaller files, .each based on
identifying keys. Log files are stored in a special server
which allows incremental additions. The great majority of
file accesses are, however, perfectly suitable for the new
storage scheme.
4_3_3 File Operations
Due to the way files are physically stored in the Amoeba
system, many of the standard file operations are not needed
with the bullet server. Indeed, the Amoeba network only has
four different operations which can be performed on a file
object. These are:
o bullet. create (server, data, size, p-factor) -) cap-
ability: this is the only way to store data on a bullet
server. The server argument specif ies which bullet
server to write to. The data and size arguments specify
the contents of the buffer to be written to disk. P-
factor, which stands for paranoia factor, tells the
operating system how carefully the user wants the file to
be stored. If a value of zero is used, it means that the
server can copy the file to its RAM cache and return
control to the user. It will then write the file to disk
when it is convenient. A positive integer (n) instructs
the kernel to physically save the file to n disks before
returning control to the user. This guarantees that in
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case of an inopportune crash, the file will have been
saved to disk. The user is allowed to trade off faster
return time for the added security of n multiple physical
i
copies of his/her file. The capability which is returned
is the way that the file is later accessed -- a full
explanation of capabilities will be given in the security
section below.
o bullet. size (capability) -> size: this call returns the
size of the file designated by capability. This infor-
mation is used to allocate local memory space for the
read operation.
bullet. read (capability, &data): this function is
invoked to read the file into local memory. The
address of the buffer created to hold the file (of
size buffer. read) is designated by &data. Alter-
natively, a section of virtual address space may be
reserved, after which the entire file may be mapped
into the virtual memory of the process.
bullet. delete (capability): deletes the file from
the bullet server and its associated cache. 19
Upon booting, a bullet server performs several steps.
First, the inode tab lee is read in from disk and stored in
the server RAH (Random Access Memory). Now called rnodes,
C The inode table contains information concerning the
physical distribution of the files on the disk -- including
but not limited to location, size, and date stamps.
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Whenever a file is accessed, this field
they remain there permanently. By keeping these tables in
RAM, there is never a wait for the inode / rnode to be
accessed from disk as sometimes happens in Unix. The server
performs disk integrity checking while it builds a (disk
space) free list and free inode list. It then blocks waiting
for requests.
The remaining RAM on the file server machine is used to
cache the files which are being accessed by users. An LRU
(Least Recently Used) strategy is used to determine which
files to hold in RAM. Each rnode has an age field to allow
this policy to work.
is updated.
~ File Creation
When a user wants to create a new file, the following
sequence of events occurs: space is allocated from the free
list, and an inode / rnode is created. The file is read into
the RAM cache on the server machine. If the P-factor is
greater than zero (the user wants the file stored on disk
immediately) the file and the inode are written directly to
disk. The reason for storing the inode immediately has to do
with security features of the Amoeba system. Included in the
inode is a random bit sequence used for cryptographic cal-
culation of the capability (as described in the security
section below). If the P-factor is zero, the file will be
written to disk only when the RAM space is needed.
37
·0 File Read
When a read command is received, the server first checks
the rnode table and the incoming capability to see if the
client making the request has valid authorization to perform
the action. Assuming the authorization is valid, the rnode
table is checked to see if the file is already in the cache.
If the file is in cache, the age field in the rnode is
updated, and the file is sent to the client. If not in cache,
the free list is searched for a space large enough to hold the
file. Upon finding such a space, the file is read in from
disk to the cache, and then sent to the client. If there is
not enough free space in RAM to hold the file, the server
frees up enough space by ejecting files (using the LRU
strategy to pick the ones to be removed) and then reads the
file into disk. In every case, when the file is eventually
sent to the user, it already resides in RAM on the server.
This allows fast access if the file is needed again.
~ File Deletion
File deletion is performed by checking authorizations,
freeing the inode, and freeing up the memory in the cache (if
the file is there). The disk space is simply put on the free
list. The file will be physically over-written when the space
is used again. This strategy does have the unfortunate
problem of causing external fragmentation on the server hard
disks. This is handled by regular compression of the disks at
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a non-peak time of day. The RAM cache is also regularly
compressed from time to time.
o File Duplication
File duplication is presently performed by a duplicate
disk on each bullet server. A write to disk actually writes
to both disks simultaneously; one disk is an exact duplicate
of the other. In case of the failure of one of the disks, the
other must merely be copied to the failed disk to repair it.
In addition, the file will be saved on n different servers (as
instructed by the user with the P-factor argument).
4.3.4 File Sys~em Performance
At the present time, the system gets approximately 500
Mbytes to each 800 Mbyte disk in use. At the cost per Mbyte
with today's technology, the designers feel that this, and the
compression time overhead, are well worth the high performance
realized by the server.
The simplification of the bullet file server is reflected
by the code which actually implements it; the complete code is
less than thirty pages of "C"o The object size of the server,
including all library routines is a only 23 Kbytes 0 The
designers have found that the simplicity of the implementation
has increased the reliability of the service. They have not
had a single server failure in over a year. 20
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The bullet server was compared to a Sun NFS server for
both read and write performance by the designers:
.. Measurements on a normally loaded Ethernet from a 16
Mhz. 68020 processor. . Compared to a Sun 3/50 using a
remote SUN 3/180 file server (using 16.7 Mhz. 68020s and
the Sun as 3.5 equipped with a 3 Mbyte buffer cache. The
read test consisted of an lseek followed by a read system
call. The write test consisted of consecutively execut-
ing creat, wri te, and close. The SUN NFS file server
uses a write through cache but writes to only one disk
(where Amoeba writes to two.) The measurements include
both communication and file server time. The bullet
server performs read operations three to six times better
than the NFS file server for all file sizes. Although
the bullet file server stores the files on two disks, for
large files, the bandwidth is 10 times that of the SUN
NFS. For very large files, (> 64 Kbytes) the bullet
server even achieves a higher bandwidth for writing than
the SUN NFS achieves for reading files. "21
The Bullet server very clearly fulfills one of the require-
ments earlier stated for improving network performance -- it
is very fast.
The ability to use diskless workstations is of mixed
benefi t. While it keeps the cost per node low, reducing the
total cost of the network, it also mandates that the files a
user needs must be kept in RAM, limiting the size of the
applications which can be run. Finally, there is no way that
the user can continue computing at a time when the network
itself is down. This problem is addressed by the next system.
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4.4 Andrew / Coda File Sys"tem
Originally designed in 1983, the Andrew system file
server has gone through several generations of change. The
original prototype design, AFSl (Andrew File System), had some
serious deficiencies. It was difficult to maintain and
performance would degrade seriously with relatively few
intense users. Design flaws made it hard to move files
between servers. AFS2 replaced AFS1 in late 1985, and worked
satisfactorily until mid 1988 when an updated version, AFS3
began to be phased in.
Presently, the primary file server for the Andrew system
is called Coda. In many respects, Coda is an updated version
of AFS2 and has more in common with it (AFS2) than with AFS3.
The many different generations of file servers underline the
main theme of the Andrew system, that is, to engineer a LAN
which uses the newest and best technology to enhance its
performance.
As depicted in figure 6, the information sharing center
of the system is called Vice, a collection of dedicated file
servers and a complex local area network. The file servers
are considered trusted, that is, they must be protected from
unauthorized tampering to maintain security. The workstations
which are connected to the network, on the other hand, are
deemed to be untrusted. No assumptions are made as to their
abili ty to prevent penetration.
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On each workstation is a
process called Venus, which interfaces with Vice to implement
the network. The hard disk of the workstation is essentially





Figure 6 Conceptual Viel' of Andrel'
Both Venus and Vice are transparent to the local user who
appears to have only a normal Unix file system with the same
files available regardless of which workstation (s) he is
logged onto. Unlike some other LANs which give,the user the
look and feel of networked computers, the designers wanted
Andrew to give the illusion of being a timesharing device --
without the shortcomings listed in the overview.
The file system appears as a standard Unix hierarchical
structure as depicted in figure 7. The shared files available
from the network appear on all nodes as a single large subtree
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of the local file system. Venus interfaces with Vice trans-
parently for all shared file operations. Symbolic links can
make remote directories found by Vice appear as local direc-




Figure 7 File Hierarchy in Andrew
As stated above, the newest generation file server is
called Coda. While AFS 1-3 were each implemented, they all
had shortcomings in their design. The lessons learned in the
earlier implementations were used to make Coda more reliable
and faster. The early AFS servers were susceptible to various
failures. Virtually every day there were several such service
interruptions. Coda endeavors to gi ve users constant data
availability, allowing the users of the system to continue
working despite failures elsewhere in the system. Built into
Coda is the capabili ty for users to continue computing even if
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the entire network fails, by using the local resources of the
workstation. 22
4.4.2 File Operations
When a user (or the application which the user is
running) needs a file, the Venus process on the local machine
intercepts the operating system call. Venus interfaces with
Vice and the entire file is transferred to the local hard disk
of the user, us ing a bulk transfez' pro tocol. From then on J
when the file is referenced, the local copy is used. When the
file is closed, it is written back to the server. Cache
coherence of the file is maintained by a callback mechanism
(described below).
This scheme provides the failure protection. The entire
file is available on the disk for use. As long as no other
files are needed, a network failure cannot interrupt the user.
This also supports portable use; the files needed while a
portable computer is disconnected from the network can be
cached for independent computing. Of course, because of the
limited size of the local hard disk, there are some limits on
the amount of files which can be cached there.
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4.4.3 File Replica~ion
Files are replicated on multiple servers to increase
failure tolerance. A Volume is the unit of replication in
Coda. A replicated volume is made up of several physical
duplicates stored on different servers. These duplicated
files are managed as one logical volume by Vice. The volumes
are transparent to the user.
The set of servers with replicas of a volume make up a
VSG (Volume Storage Group). When a file is cached on a user's
hard disk, Venus keeps track of the subset of the VSG which is
currently accessible by that user. This subset is called the
AVSG (Accessible Volume Storage Group). Each client may have
a different AVSG, depending on location and server avail-
ability. In the current version of Coda, the local Venus
process checks for a change in the AVSG every ten minutes and
updates the information in the cache.
4.4.4 File Access
When a file is referenced, the cache on the local disk is
searched. If the file is there, the sys tern acts 1 ike a
standard Unix system, and returns the requested data. If the




Venus tries to get a copy of the file from one of the
servers listed in the AVSG. This server, which may be chosen
at random, due to its proximity, or based on some other
criteria, is called the pz'eferz'ed server. Venus sends a
message to this preferred server, asking that the file be sent
to the local cache. One of several consequences can ensue
from this call:
¢ A message is sent to the other servers of the AVSG asking
for the status of the file in question. If the versions
of the file match on all of the servers, the data is sent
and cached. If there are no stale (outdated or super-
seded) copies of the file, the call is concluded.
If some of the files are stale, the servers with the
stale copies are notified asynchronously that the files
need to be refreshed.
If the preferred server's copy of the file is stale,
another server is chosen to become the preferred server.
If some of the replicas of the file are in conflict, the
system call which caused the cache miss is aborted. The
copies of the files in conflict are temporarily stored at
each server at a special location called a co vol ume. The
user is expected to edit the files at a later time. The
techniques describing this process will be described
below.
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4. 4. 5 File Version Control
In keeping with the philosophy of reducing unneeded
server cycles, Coda uses an optimistic strategy when it comes
to cache coherence. Venus assumes that all entries in the
local caches are the latest versions of the files. The files
are then kept consistent by means of callbacks. Earlier
versions of the server used a pessimistic strategy. Each time
a file was used, the timestamp was checked with the server
responsible for the file over the network. While this
guaranteed coherence, it was very ineff icient with commun-
ication resources. Each file reference generated at least
one communications interaction with the server. 23
A callback works as follows: when the file is cached on
a workstation's disk, the server has a commitment to notify
the local Venus process before allowing that file to be
modified by any other user. Unless notified, therefore, Venus
makes the optimistic assumption that the file is still the
latest copy. This obviously can cause problems in case of
network or server crash. If the callback is lost, there may
be multiple users modifying the same file causing an inconsis-
tency. The designers of Coda have deemed that the chances of
that happening are s lim enough to be worth the savings in
communications overhead.
In order to lessen the possibility of a callback being
lost, both Vice and the local Venus keep the callback infor-
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mation. In the event of workstation crash, all local files on
the disk automatically become suspect. When a server is
instructed to update or modify a file, it must first notify
all of the clients currently holding a valid "callback. In the
interest of keeping server cycles to a minimum, after the
callback the server does not have to actually disseminate the
file to all of the servers holding replicas of the file. That
job is assigned to the workstation making the change. That
node must broadcast (multicast) the changes in the file to all
of the servers in its AVSG. Likewise, directory changes made
by the user must also be broadcast to the AVSG members.
Coda uses a lazy strategy to detect version conflicts
between servers, that is, it waits until an attempt to open a
file is made before checking the consistency of the file. The
history of all updates is kept in an update set at each
server. In the case of a conflict, this update set is used by
the client to determine which copy of the file is the correct
one. In the event of a crash, each file on the server is
judged suspect; it is not, however, checked for validity until
it is called for (the lazy strategy). The designers are in
the process of redesigning this feature to have Vice make the
consistency check when the server comes back on line. This
should improve the efficiency of the system.
48
Table 1
Configura tion Load Units lJakeDir Copy ScanDir ReadAll llake fota1
Coda: 3 1 5(1) 48(1) 33(1) 52(1) 248(5) 386(5)
Coda: 2 1 5(1) 46(2) 32(1) 52(1) 247(1) 384(3)
Coda: 1 1 5(0) 42(1) 32(1) 52(1) 242(2) 373(3)
Coda: HoRep 1 4(0) 38(1) 32(0) 52(1) 241(1) 368(2)
AFS 1 7(3) 40(1) 27(2) 53(0) 242(4) 369(7)
lJnil 1 5(2) 22(1) 21(1) 36(1) 221(1) 305(1)
Load equal to five netflOrk users. Tim r:easured in seconds. boor in () is standMd deviation.
Input to OOncbrmk test is a subtree of 70 files totalling 200 kbytes in sue. Five sections to the
test: JJahDir /lhich constructs a subtree identical to the source; CoPT/lhich copies every file to the
nell tree; ScaDJ)ir Ilhich recursively traverses the tree and ezaai.nes the status of every file; KeadA11.
Ilhich scans every byte of every file t/lice; IlaiB /lhich coE!Piles and links all of the files. Bencbrmk
/las run three tims -- values are the mans of the tests. Coda files replicated tims sho/lD., AFS2 and
local (non-netflOrk) Uniz file system Sho/lD.. 34
Updates and server message interaction frequently involve
several servers rather than just two. In the interests of
reducing communication overhead, all inter-server communica-
tion is done by broadcasting the messages to every server
using a parallel RPC mechanism. This technique reduces the
latency time of contacting all servers in a group sequential-
ly. Typically, sending a large file to three servers incurs
only a 10% penalty in communication time over the transmission
of the file to just one server; this can be seen in table
1. 25
As can be seen by the above benchmark chart, the repli-
cation of Coda files causes very little delay over non-
replication. The chart also shows that networked Coda
compares reasonably well to local Unix file systems when it
comes to latency.
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When no member of a VSG can be contacted by a client, it
is said to be disconnected. This is the case when a portable
computer is used and then removed from the network. To reduce
the chance of being inconvenienced when disconnected (volu-
ntarily or involuntarily), the user can specify files to be
held in the local cache at all times. The specified files are
termed sticky files. Other files can be prioritized so that
they are not routinely removed in the (LRU) replacement policy
actions.
It must be noted that the one-copy Unix semantics do not
apply to the Andrew system. In Unix, every change of any byte
in a file must be immediately available to every process with
access to that file. In Andrew, this is not poss i ble due to
the way file operations are completed on cached files.
Updating each intermediate state of every file would generate
prohibitive network traffic.
The des igners are still working to improve the Coda
system. Generally, however, though a bit s lower than the
earlier AFS systems, the safety of replication, the high
availability and the scalability of Coda have made this system
comparable to virtually any high performance file server that
was surveyed.
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4.5 V Sys-tem File Service
The file service facilities of V are conceptually very
simple. They follow the same guidelines as almost all of the
server implementations designed into V. A complete discussion
of server implementation will be given in the section on RPC
implementation below.
As already stated for the other surveyed systems, the
sharing of files is one of the most important features of a
network. The efficiency of the mechanism does much to define
the speed of the network. Unlike Amoeba and Coda, file
sharing in V is not performed by transmitting whole files over
the communications lines. The designers of V determined that
often a user does not need an entire file, that only a small
portion of the file will satisfy the user's need. When the
entire file is not necessary, transmission of the whole file
is not necessary.
4.5.2 File Inst;ance Server
Files can be stored on any machine with a hard disk. The
local file s ys tem is managed by a storage server process
running on that machine. In the current version of V, most of
the files are actually stored on dedicated server machines
with mass disk storage. Most V nodes currently do not have
disks due to the extra expense and inherent noise level. 25
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Like many other server types in V, the storage server is a
member of a group of similar type servers, all of whom have
th~~ame well known group id. A server's pid (personal id)
can de decoded by using the group id.
Once a client has a server's pid, it can open (or create)
a file by making a create_instance call (usually done by
calling the open library routine) as shown in figure 8 [lJ.
Application
Figure 8 Access ing a f He ins tance in V
The kernel forwards the message to the storage server which in
turn passes it on to the team server [2] (a concept which will
be discussed in the process management section below). The
team server creates a process called a file instance server
[3] whose only job is handling requests for that particular
file. Further requests for file manipulation are then passed
on directly to the file instance server for service. [4] The
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pid of the file instance server is sent to the requesting
process for future use [5]. In this way, the file has a
dedicated lightweight thread of control which blocks waiting
for requests. The file (or part of a file) is read in from
disk and cached in the local RAM. When the close call is
received, the file is read back to disk with all of the
changes made and the file instance server thread is de-
stroyed. 27
4.5.3 Input/Output Protocol
V uses a OI/O interface (Uniform Input/Output) as the
system level I/O handler. All standard C and Pascal functions
are mapped to the UI/O routines so that application programs
can be run without changes to the I/O routines. As stated
before, the driving idea behind V is to define a protocol and
then allow software writers adapt to it. In V, the protocol
defines how the I/O will be executed and the actual routines
are then written for each machine to implement the protocols.
Table 2
Server Loca tion get_byte Disk(byt;es) Disk(blocks) IK:
local 6.23 9.91 3.47 1. 79
.rem.:Jte 6.23 14.63 8.18 6.34
Tire (in .illiseconds) to access 1 Kilobyte on a lficrovaxII. GeLbyte is tbe V
version of getc 1024 tiDes (to return 1024 bytes.) Disk (bytes) is tbe sa,e plus
cost of 1 kilobyte read fro. serrer. Disk (blocks) is ti,e to get a 1 kilobyte
Iiitbout the 1024 getc ·s. IPC is tbe actual cOllunication tire cost of tbese operations. 1I
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As an illustration of this method, assume a getc function
call to get a byte of data from a file which has been opened
already. Recall that V uses a block-oriented data access
model (as compared to the Unix byte-oriented model), using
virtual paging. The getc function is implemented using the
get_byte operation of the UI/O. The request goes to the
kernel which checks to see if the page containing the byte is
in the local page buffer. If it is, the page is sent to the
application -- elapsed time, as shown in table 2, is as low as
1. 79 microseconds. If it is not in the 9uffer, the kernel
---
sends a read request to the I/O service module in the file
server machine which holds the file instance. A block is sent
back to a buffer in the local machine, which then sends the
byte as before. This is shown in figure 9. The block may
already be in a RAM cache (put there when the file was
opened) .29
.,
Kernel Network Kernel Ale Server "\Application
Local Buffer
Getbyte-) 000000000 -} -) ....a...-) } --} -} Remote
L 000000000 Read Send Request Reaeve Read000000000000000000 Op.Storage {- {- {- (- {-
~ Respons( Reply ~
Figure 9 Reading a byte fro. a file
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The access speed of this sequence of events is obviously
predicated on efficient communication. The RPC section below
will discuss the details of this operation more completely.
The initial overhead of this sequence is low since only
a fixed size block is originally moved. Every access inside
that block is extremely fast. The communications service only
needs to be utilized when a byte outside of the block is
requested.
4.6 File Syscem Comparisons
These three different file server strategies have one
common thread running through them: speed of file transfer is
essential for the network to appear transparent to the user.
Each network attacks the problems differently, but all are
trying to solve the same problems. A file, which resides on
a remote disk, needs to be moved to the user's node for local
use. In Amoeba and Coda, the whole file is moved, while in V,
just enough of the file is transferred to satisfy the user.
In each case, however, the user gets the impression of
locality for the file especially when compared to the
slower NFS system. \~hich system is best? Each must be judged
in light of the rest of the network of which it is part.
The Amoeba system caches the entire file in the local
Ram. If most of the file is never accessed, the speed per
byte accessed could be much lower than with V. Similarly,
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Andrew caches the entire file on the local hard disk. The
access time to read that disk plus the original time for
sending the file could make the Andrew system slower in many
cases (assuming efficient communications in V again). If the
whole file is needed, V's access time might be longer due to
repeated remote access overhead. In the final analysis, the
best performer of the three depends on the specific way in
which the file is utilized.
One of the features which the file system depends on to
increase the speed is the file directory service. This is the
topic of the next chapter.
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5. DISTRIBUTED DIRECTORY SERVICES
When files can be found in a number of different places,
as on a network, the directory service takes on a magnified
importance. For a network to appear truly transparent to the
user , it is the directory service which must perform the
difficult work. If the user types in a string of characters
in an attempt to access a file, the directory service must
quickly map that string to the desired file. It does not
matter on which machine the file resides, or if it is repli-
cated on several. If the file exists, it must be found. The
authorization of the user to access the file must be checked.
The type of file must be ascertained -- it would not do for
the user to load an executable file into an line editor. If
the file does not exist, this too must be ascertained.
All of the above are functions of the distributed
directory service. In a single processor system, the direc-
tory service is usually considered a part of the file system.
In distributed systems, the directory can be thought of
autonomously, for it usually performs these other functions as
part of its job description. At its most basic, a directory
is a device to map ASCII names onto physical files. Access to
the file itself may only consist of finding an inode (Unix),
an rnode (Amoeba), or some other structure which maps the file
onto a physical file system somewhere in magnetic memory. The
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directory provides an interface for a human user to allow the
identification and access of a particular file.
5.2 Sun Yellofl Pages
The Yellow pages, the distributed directory service which
works with the NFS, is supplied by Sun with its SunOs oper-
ating system. As such, it is the most commonly used distri-
buted directory service in use. It is a distributed name
service; given a name (considered a key value), the service
returns a value to the user (usually a network address). A
Yellow Pages database is called a map. These maps are used to
eliminate the need to update local files on individual
machines on the network by replacing the local files with
maps. These maps are accessible by any machine within a local
Yellow Pages domain. 3 0 Within a domain, there can be sev-
eral Yellow Pages servers. One server is cons idered the
master and the others slaves. When the maps on the master are
updated, the changes are promulgated to the s laves in a
process called pushing (copying the changes to the slave
servers). Since the Yellow Pages maps replace local directory
files, a change to the network configuration can be simply
done by changing the map in the master and pushing the changes
to all of the slaves.
The maps themselves are not ASCII files but data base
(dbm3) files for faster access. Each map is a subdirectory in
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the directory /var/yp. The use of the Yellow Pages is not
essential as in other networks studied. It simply makes the
administration of the network eas ier and faster. The standard
Unix directory service could be used. There is much room for
improvement; all three networks have implemented different
directory services.
5.3 Amoeba Directory Service
A typical Amoeba user may have access to literally
thousands of capabilities. d These include public objects
such as commands, databases, public files, and private files.
Amoeba uses a hierarchical directory structure for naming the
capabilities needed to access these objects. Since a direc-
tory itself is an object, it too has a capability. This
design allows for public, private and group access to par-
ticular directories and subdirectories -- basically the same
access as allowed by Unix (personal, group and global access
to files).
The directory server works in conjunction with the bullet
server, handling the naming and protection of objects. It
maps ASCII names to capabilities for easier human interface.
By providing a single, partially shared global name space for
d As described in chapter 6, a capability is concep-
tually a key to an object -- files and directories are all
objects in the Amoeba system. The holder of a capability is
allowed access to an object.
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objects, multiple bullet servers can be linked into a single
large file service which transcends geographical areas.
A user (or a process) sends an ASCII string to the
directory server and, if a match is found, the server responds
by sending back a capability to the client. The capability is
then used to access that particular object. The directory
server no longer is involved in the transaction.
Table 3
Object HaDe Capabili ties Offner Group Other
capS 11111 11001 00001
file_l capl, cap17 11111 11000 10000
printer3 capS, cap8 11111 11100 10010
dir44 cap12 11111 00000 00000
prog.cpp cap3, cap43 11111 01010 00000
Basic Director, Structure in ADOeba'l
Due to the hierarchical nature of the directory service,
the user needs the capability of the directory which (s)he
wishes to search. The directory does not differentiate the
types of objects which are listed wi thin, nor is there a
specific location assumed for the objects. The phys ical
structure of a directory is fairly simple. It is made up of
a series of rows, one to an object as shown in table 3. The
first column consists of the ASCII string which is mapped to
the capability (or capabilities) of the object in the second
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column. Three remaining columns each give a user class
different access rights, much as the Unix file access scheme.
Three of the rights bits in the capability control access to
these columns (owner, group, and other).
When a client provides a directory capability and an
identifying string to the directory server, the string is used
to access the correct row in the table of the correct direc-
tory. The rights bitmap is checked to find which class
column the client is entitled to use. The correct entry from
that row and column are then extracted. These values are both
cached for future use (to reduce traffic on the server) and
sent to the client.
There are a number of operations which can be performed
on a directory, including look-ups, adding and removing rows
from the directory, and listing and deleting whole subdirec-
tories. Some commands, involving multiple operations are done
atomically, preventing state operations which could cause
inconsistencies in case of a crash.
There is also support for replication. The cap-
abili ty column in the directory can hold multiple capabil-
ities. Thus, if an object is replicated on multiple servers,
any of the copies can be made available. If one server is
unavailable, an alternate can be provided to a requesting
client. The directory server can also be replicated to
provide better fault tolerance.
61
One possible drawback to the file server / directory
server scheme as designed in Amoeba is that both operations
are independent. The file is created and then the capability
is entered into a directory. Should a crash intervene, there
could be a file which exists but cannot be accessed.
At the present time, each directory attempts to access
each file which it lists every k days. The bullet servers
than remove each file not accessed in n days (n »k). This
strategy ensures that any free floating files are eventually
dealt with. 3 2
The directories are encrypted in the Amoeba system to
prevent possible bugs in the operating system or other
possible failures from revealing confidential information to
unauthorized users. The encryption key is X-Ored with a
random number and then stored along side of the directory.
The random number is only held in the capability for the
directory. The directory itself does not store the random
number. When a request comes in, the capability of the client
making the request is checked for the number. An incorrect
number will not unlock the directory. This strategy gives the
directory service added security.
5.4 /J.ndre~ / Coda Directory
As explained above, the Coda file directory appears as a
single large subdirectory to all users. This is a much better
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abstraction than that used in the NFS, which appears to insert
the files in different places depending on where the mount
function is executed. Consistency in the directories without
regard to which machine is being used helps ease the learning
curve for users.
Due to the way that Andrew caches files on the hard disk
of users workstations, it is feasible for directory and
pathname data to also be cached locally. Callbacks provide
location data which are also available in a slowly changing
volume location database which is duplicated on each server.
The network is decomposed into cells, each of which has
its own servers, workstations, system administrators, and
users. While each cell is totally autonomous, cells can be
combined to build a system much like the Amoeba domain scheme
(nodes of LANs interconnected). The cells can cooperate to
simulate a single seamless filename space.
Each file which Vice handles is identified by a unique
FID (File Identification). Each entry in a directory maps a
filename to an FID. Servers atc~ss the files with FIDs and






Volume Number V-Node Number Uniquifier
Figure 10 96 Bit File Identifier for Andrei System
As illustrated in figure 10, an FID is 96 bits long and
is composed of three fields:
¢ a 32 bit volume number for the VSG.
a 32 bit Vnode number. This number is an index into an
array which holds the file storage information for the
files in a single volume.
a 32 bit uniquifier. This number ensures that two
different files never have the same FID.33
All replicas of the same file have the same FID, unlike
Amoeba, where each replica has a different capability va-
lue. Because the F ID does not contain any location infor-
mation, files can be moved to or from any available server.
The location information is kept in a database on each server
as noted above. A directory consists of a simple list < name,
FID> of pairs on which two modification functions, create and
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delete, can act. Changes to the protection status on the
files can also be performed.
This directory structure, much like the Amoeba system's,
makes accessing and handling files much easier than the NFS
system. It is designed to minimize the communication overhead
needed to access files.
5.5 V Directory Service
As in the other networks surveyed, V supplies a directory
service which includes mapping ASCII string names to objects,
flexible user-level name specification facilities, binding and
unbinding of objects to names, and extensibility for new
applications.
The des igners have implemented this by allowing each
object manager to effect names for the set of objects which it
manages. Each file server, therefore, has its own directory.
This strategy was devised to reduce communications time to
consult a centralized name service. To achieve this reduc-
tion, the requesting node must already be cognizant of the
server(s) which hold the file desired.
This scheme has several other advantages over a central
naming facility. There are no consistency problems between
the files and the directories because both are implemented by
the same server. When a file server is replicated for
increased failure tolerance, the directory structure is also
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replicated at the same time. If a file server fails when the
directory server is on a separate node, a client may be led to
believe that a file is immediately available when it is not.
Different types of file systems can be connected to the
network, each with its own idiosyncratic directory structure.
As long as the server complies with all of the prevailing
protocols, there are no mapping problems between files and
directories.
An object manager mounts its directories into the global
name space by prefixing a unique global name onto the direc-
tories. It then adds itself to the name handling group (a set
of all such servers). A client locates the appropriate object
manager for a des ired object by multicasting a QueryName
operation to the name handling group. The appropriate server
will answer and the connection will be made. The information
on the data manager will then be cached to avoid the need for
re-multicast communications. There is a global database kept
of the legal object manager name prefixes to prevent wasted
communication time due to the search for names that are
incorrect.
The cached information can be inconsistent if the server
changes or the object moves. This chance of inconsistency was
judged rare enough that no particular scheme was designed to
offset the possibility. Should stale information or data be
found, the cache entry is deleted and the multicast is
repeated.
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5.6 Directory Service Comparisons
Each of the surveyed directory services is different from
the others because each has a unique set of tasks designed for
it. The Yellow pages is interchangeable with the standard
Unix directory because it provides only a naming service and
nothing else. The Yellow pages were added as (almost) an
afterthought to provide convenience to users of NFS. In
contrast, the directory service of each of the networks
surveyed provides a number of other integral functions.
Security, speed, cons istency checks, and replication functions
are provided by the different directory services because each
network was designed as an integrated whole.
When a service is designed from the lowest level to be
optimized for speed and efficiency , it will inherently be
faster and more efficient than a service which must be retro-
engineered to be compatible with an existing feature (as is
the case of the Yellow Pages). The complete design cycle also
allows the integration of features which logically should be
included this is seen in all three networks. The security




One of the more important areas of network research is
security. The very nature of networking creates several
security problems not seen in single processor computing. A
networked Syst~ must have remote terminals available for use.
That availabvCity is an invitation for illicit use and
(
attempted se~~rity penetrations. Each network designer must
develop strategies to ensure that protected areas of hardware
,
and software are not penetrated. There is a delicate line
between too much security and not enough. A hardware key used
each time the user types a sentence, or the requirement of
periodic quizzes to check authorization would not be reason-
able, nor would users wish to use such a system. On the other
hand, users do want to be reasonably certain that personal
files and directories stay private. The system designer must
provide for reasonable security measures to insure this
protection.
Two of the three networks surveyed have been des igned
with the highest priority on ensuring security.e Preventing
unauthorized login is but the first step of security. A
password is easy enough to steal. What can be stolen or
damaged after the perpetrator has access to the system? Can
e The V system is not a production quality network yet;




access at the user shell level allow penetration of the
operating system kernel? Can hardware be used to penetrate
security? These and other questions need to be answered by
the system designers. Where these questions apply, they will
be answered in this chapter; it will examine the Sun NFSjRPC
as used by the generalized Unix network first, and then each
studied system in turn.
6.2 Sun NFS Security
Basic security in the generalized Unix system is similar
to standard Unix protection schemes. A password file (/etc-
/passwd) has the login name of everyone allowed access to the
system. Also in the file is the login directory for the user,
the shell invoked once the user is logged in, the UID (User
ID), the GID (Group ID) and the encrypted password which the
user must correctly type when logging in. The system mayor
may not use the shadow password strategy which allows only the
super user to see the file of encrypted passwords to prevent
unauthorized attempts to break the encryption scheme.
Password aging can be used to force the periodic alteration of
a user's password to limit the potential damage of a stolen or
intercepted password.
Sun RPC has alternate techniques of user authentication
possible. Null authentication (no scheme) is the default but
Unix authorization is most commonly used. The Unix scheme
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transmits the following fields for every RPC request: a time
stamp, the name of the local host, the client's effective Uln
and GIn, and a list of all the other group Ids to which the
client belongs. The server then examines these fields to
determine if the client's request can be granted. 34
The NFS server accepts this information (called a creden-
Q
tial) and attempts to use it to access the requested file.
Unix files use 3 X 3 levels of authorization to determine who
can access files. Possible access is given to owner, group
and other while the kind of access is read, write and execute.
These authorizations guide the decis ion of the system to grant
requests. A non Unix based user must generate the credential
when access ing the server. This can be accomplis hed by
passing a file with the data in it, or using the default Uln
nobody.
The super user has access to every facet of the Unix
system. This access could be a problem with a Unix network.
Consider the case of an unscrupulous user who connects his/her
workstation to the network. The user is also the super-user
of the local system, with access to the kernel and to the root
password. With the root password, the user can impersonate
another user through the use of the su username command. This
changes the effective Uln to username as far as the system is
concerned, defeating the Unix credential passing capability.
The recently released NFSSRC 4.0 of the operating system has
70
eliminating this breach of security by insisting that the real
UID and not the effective UID be passed in RPCs.
6.3 Amoeba Security
Virtually all of the securi ty built into the Amoeba
system is associated with the use of capabilities. The Amoeba
system is conceptually object oriented. The entire system can
be viewed as a set of objects, each of which contains a set of
operations which can be performed on that object. When an
object (either hardware or software) is designed, the list of
operations which can be performed with it is defined by the
designer / programmer.
Identified with each object is a capability (conceptua-
lly, a virtual key) which permits the holder to perform some
(not necessarily all) operations on that object. 35For exam-
ple, a file is an object which has certain operations which
can be performed upon it. It can be read, written or deleted.
A user may hold a capability to read the file but not write it
-- were (s)he to try a write calIon that file, the operating
system would prevent it.
Each authorized user has a diverse set of capabilities
available, that is, a set of objects which (s)he is entitled
to use. Public files, sanctioned peripherals, necessary
executables etc. must all be procurable for users to access.
In addition, the use of these should be transparent to the
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user. Requiring the constant inputting of passwords or
security procedures when trying to access objects would
destroy the basic tenets of networking. This necessitates a
complex structure to implement these capabilities.
128 Bit Capability
~8 bit 2~ 8 48
/ / \
Server Port Object Number Rights Field Check Aeld
Figure 11 128 Bit Aaoeba Capability
As depicted in figure 11, an Amoeba capability is 128
bits long and consists of four fields:
~ a 48 bit server port which is used to des ignate the
server process that manages the object to which the
capability refers. This is a random number which is
designated by the server itself.
a 24 bit object number which is used by the server to
identify which of its objects is being addressed.
an 8 bit rights field which cons ists of a bitmap
designating the legal operations which the user is
entitled to access on the object. This is encrypted so
that the user cannot change authorizations unilaterally.
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a 48 bit check field used in the encryption process.
As an example of the creation of an object, consider the
creation of a file. A client requests that the file be
written (it is in a buffer in the client's RAM). The server
receives the request and picks an available slot in its
internal tables. It places the information about the object
(the file) along with a freshly generated 48 bit random number
into that slot. The index into the table is stored in the
object number field of a capability, the rights bits are all
set to is (giving the owner universal rights over the file),
and the random number is put in the check field. 'This
capability is then returned to the client.
The owner can now access the file whenever desired. When
the capability is sent to the server to reference the file,
the object number field is used to index into the tables to
identify the object. If all of the rights bits are on, it is
known to be an owner capability. The random number in the
rnode (defined above in the file server section) is compared
to the number in the check field. If the two numbers match,
the capability is deemed to be valid, and the operation
requested is perfor~ed.
There may be times when the owner of a object wishes to
give another user partial use of an object (for example, read
but not write permissions on a file). The owner of a capabil-
ity may fabricate another capability by turning off (resetting
to zero) some of the rights bits in the capability and then
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XOR-ing the rights field with the check field. This result is
then run through a one way function f and put in the check
field. If, when the server tests the rights field, it is not
all is, it then accesses the original random number and runs
the rights bits and that number through the one way function.
If that number and the check field match, the capability is
accepted.
The security derives from the near impossibility of
reversing the one way function; a bootleg capability will be
summarily dismissed since the numbers will never match. A
user cannot intercept a capability, decode the check field
and discover the original random number for the same rea-
son. 36
The use of this security scheme means that only the
dedicated servers must be protected from penetration to
safeguard the Amoeba system. The user nodes are reasonably
safe if the users are careful with their personal passwords
(no system can guard fools against themselves). Penetration,
even if it happens on the user level, is kept on that level.
Once a user is logged onto the system, the directories
available to him/her have all of the objects which (s)he is
allowed to access. Because the capabilities are stored in the
£ A one way function f has the following key property:
given the 48 bit check field (N) and the 8 bit rights field
(R), it is easy to compute
C = f( N XOR R)
but given C, it is nearly impossible to find an argument to f
which produces that given C.
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directories (see Directory Service chapter below), anything
that the user is allowed to access will be automatically
available. Any objects for which the user has no permissions
will be invisible to the user. The capabilities for all
intents and purposes are unbreakable due to the one way
function encoding. The sum total of these features makes the
Amoeba system at once both secure and easy to use.
6.4 Andrew Security
The designers of Andrew are also aware that there is no
absolutely fool-proof way to guarantee security throughout an
entire network. The physical dispersion of the workstations
makes that an impossibility. Therefore, the designers decided
to try a different approach to keeping the system secure. The
major component of the security strategy is to keep the
servers which comprise Vice secure. The servers are physical-
ly isolated from general users and, at no time, is any user
software actually run on the servers. The servers are
considered trusted; physical access to a server is all that
would be needed to penetrate the security of the whole system.
The only persons allowed physical access to the servers
are those known by the name System: Administrators. To be a
member of this group is to have total access to all files and
sectors of the system. Unlike the sysop of a straight Unix
system, however, a System:Administrator is known by his
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identity and not by a pseudo-user identity (such as "root" in
the Unix domain). This allows an audit trail of the actual
identity of the perpetrator should the system security be
breached. 37 Workstations, on the other hand, are assumed to
be un trus ted. Physical access to workstations must be assured
to all. It is assumed, therefore, that any workstation at any
time could be penetrated by someone wishing to do harm to the
network.
The protection domain of Andrew is made up of users and
groups (groups being made up of users and other groups). A
user is a person who can prove to Vice that (s)he has author-
ization to use the network. The user is held responsible for
his /her actions and is charged for network resource con-
sumption. Each group has someone who is deemed responsible
for the actions of the group in the aggregate -- a quasi-super
user.
Since all workstations are suspect, there must be a
mechanism to allow connection of a user to the network. A
password is typed in by a prospective user. If the password
is authenticated by Vice, the user is sent authorization
tokens by the authentication server. These are cached by the
local Venus process. When secure communication is needed with
Vice, it is these tokens that are used to prove authorization.
Wi th the tokens, there is no need to repeatedly type in
passwords or use other means to allow access. These tokens
have a finite life span. That way. even if the system is
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penetrated -- by a stolen password, for example -- the damage
can be contained.
Robustness is added by having a number of authentication
servers. All but one are slaves to a master server. The
master is the only server on which changes can be made. This
scheme prevents server cras hes from halting access to the
system. Even if the master is not on line, users can log in
(they cannot, however, change their passwords at this time).
When the master server is on line, updates are propagated to
the slave servers asynchronously (to reduce communications
costs) .
File security is enhanced by using an access list
mechanism. The rights to a file for a user are a union of
his/her personal rights and the group rights of all of the
groups of which (s)he is a member. Unlike Unix, these rights
are associated with the directories rather than the individual
files. To further enhance security, the system also supports
negative rights, which allow directory access denial to
specific users and groups if desired. The use of negative
rights allows the rapid revocation of access authorization if
security penetration occurs. Venus emulates the file access
bi ts that Unix uses although Vice can ignore these if it
wants. This allows a personal user to protect his/her local
files in the cache from unauthorized use by another user on
the same machine.
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The design decisions made by the creators of Andrew have
been conceived to allow maximum ease for the users at the
lowest communication costs possible. The tradeoffs made to
ensure security while still allowing ease of use appear to
have been successful.
6.5 V SecurLty
It must be specif ied that, at its present state of
development, V is not a commercial production system but an
experimental system. At the present time, therefore, the
security measures which have been taken in V are not foolproof
on any level. For this reason, at the present time nearly all
of the security relies on the system running in a "relatively
friendly environment. "38 There are some rudimentary secur-
ity structures presently built in.
A user logs onto the network by issuing a login command
on an available machine and typing in his/her password. This
action is depicted in figure 12. The login command results in
the kernel sending a message to the authentica tion server
requesting a PID (personal identification) which acts as a
authorization token when requesting services from storage and
team servers. The authentication server mayor may not be
replicated. The request includes the login account number and
password which are checked against the encrypted entries in
the authentication server.
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1. login request asks AuthenUtaUon server for user number.
2. " yOlid. number Is sent.
1
Figure 12 Login authori!ation in V
If the two match, the server sends the pid back. That
number. is then associated with that process (and its progeny)
by the local kernel, and will be included in every message
sent by them. 39 In effect, it acts as does the capability
in the Amoeba system.
6.6 Securi~y Comparisons
Virtually all computer systems need some kind of "login"
verification to allow only authorized users access to the
system.
ferent.
These three surveyed systems are certainly no dif-
A network, however, has the need for more stringent
security measures due to its vulnerable distributed topology.
The V system lacks the necessary systems for protection,
mainly because of its still experimental nature.
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NFS has
little more security built in than does a standard Unix single
processor system, and, therefore, should run in a protected
environment.
Both Amoeba and Andrew are more robust when it comes to
security. The use of encrypted capabilities in the Amoeba
system allow a very user tolerant system where the security
measures are transparent to the users. The use of one way
functions makes access to objects virtually tamper proof. The
need to physically isolate the machines of Vice means that
security is not quite as stringent with the Andrew system. A
pos i tive action (guarding the servers) mus t be taken to
prevent tampering.
A network will not be chosen strictly on the basis of its
security, however. The problems caused by outside tampering
can be ameliorated by measures taken externally. Internal
problems can also cause interruption of service. How a




When a single processor computer fails, the system must
be repaired before the user can continue computing. In a
network, a single failure cannot be allowed to cause the
shutdown of the entire system. If the user's own workstation
fails, that failure, of course, would prevent that user from
computing. Hardware / software failures elsewhere on the
system should not affect the remote user, however. The
current level of technology available for networks ensures
that there will be both hardware and software failures to deal
with. It stands to reason that a failure in a component which
provides a service to a client would cause a shutdown if it
failed. For example, if the only server containing a client's
files were to fail, the files would not be available.
Likewise, if a password validation server were to fail, the
client would not be able to log onto the network.
Every network tries to control this problem by use of
replication. This means that critical services are duplicated
so that a failure of one server is not catastrophic. Another
server in a different location can supply the same services
until the damaged machine comes back on line. On the other
hand, unbounded replication to make a network totally failure
proof (i. e. replicating every file at every node of the
network) would make the network both totally unwieldy and
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prohibitively expensive. For replication to be effective, the
availability of the exact duplication of services must be
assured. For example, if a file was updated on server x which
then immediately crashed, the replicated server y should have
the updated version of the file. Version control on repli-
cated servers is a major problem which must be addressed by
network designers.
Another failure problem common to networks is lost
messages. With most systems, these losses are only a minor
problem due to the reliability of the communication protocols.
However, since most networks use UDP protocols which do not
guarantee delivery of messages, lost messages are a pos-
sibility. Most networks handle this problem by use of
timeouts. After a message is sent, a request is expected
wi thin a certain time. If the reques t does not arrive, the
message may be sent again or an inquiry -may be sent to ensure
that it was not the reply message that got lost. In either
case, this particular failure mode is generally a function of
the data transport level and not directly the responsibility
of the network software.
The generalized Unix network does not use any special
failure-proofing mechanisms other than already noted. This
lack directly affects the scalability of the bas ic Unix
network. The larger the network becomes, the higher the
potential for catastrophic failures. Certain implementations
82
may have built in mechanisms for failure tolerance, but they
are beyond the scope of this paper.
The surveyed networks all have specific features designed
to deal with component failures. In most cases, this means
replication of specific services and optimization of how that
replication is handled.
7.2 Amoeba Failure Tolerance
As already noted above, the first level of replication in
Amoeba is the duplication of all files on each server by use
of dual disks, each of which is written to whenever a file
write is called. In case of failure on one disk, the other
disk can be copied directly to it to ensure exact duplication.
Until the copy is done, the remaining [good] disk is still
capable of carrying out all function calls.
Servers are replicated to allow continued operation even
if an entire server machine goes down. The directory service
allows multiple capabilities per object, each one identical
except for the port address of the server which controls it.
When a capability is returned by the directory service, a
failure of the server simply causes another of the capabil-
ities to be sent. The system can be set up to automatically
replicate files across different servers and then generate
capability sets to be held in the directory server. The
directory servers themselves are also duplicated. It is
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possible to update the directory services even while the
network is in use. This update is accomplished by killing off
one instance of the directory, installing the new version as
the replacement, and then removing the other versions of the
original. The new replications of the directory service are
then added to bring the system back up to full function-
ality.40
Because all files (except as noted earlier) are im-
mutable, there is no problem with version control in Amoeba.
Files can be replicated at will and copies regenerated as
desired. The entire replication process is automated, and
takes place in the background so that the users are not
inconvenienced.
7.3 Andrew Failure Tolerance
As noted previous ly, one of the factors which gave
impetus for the development of the Coda file system was the
high failure rate of the AFS systems which preceded it. The
des igners decided to address system failures in two ways:
replication of files on multiple file servers in case of
server failure, and the ability for a node to go to fully
autonomous operation in case of total network failure.
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As long as a client maintains contact with at least one
of the servers in the AVSGg, (s) he is impervious to file
server failure elsewhere. The mechanisms to handle a failure
of the preferred server have already been described. These
will find an available server and contact it. Should all
contact with the servers of the AVSG be lost, the local
'.
workstation resorts to what is called disconnected operation.
If the files necessary for use are already cached on the disk,
then the user might not even know of the disconnection or
subsequent reconnection. Both disconnection and reconnect ion
are transparent to the user as long as there are no cache
misses. If a file is not in the cache, a cache miss will
cause a .. file open failure when a server with that file
stored cannot be found.
Note that a user who makes essential files sticky (up to
the size of the cache) will better survive a system failure.
This ability to plan ahead for failure was added to allow
portable computer connection to the system. Venus can perform
a file usage trace for a given time. This trace allows the
user to know which files are actually needed for an applica-
tion. . Those files can then be given priority to avoid their
removal as part of the cache LRU replacement policy.
With the exception of portable computers, disconnected
operation is considered a last resort measure and the system
g
Group) .
For a review of the AVSG (Accessible Volume Storage
see page 44.
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will try to reconnect at the earliest chance. Once the
reconnection is done, all files are considered suspicious and
are checked against server files for consistency, using the
mechanisms already explained above. The update during the re-
integration into the system may fail for two different
reasons: the authentication tokens may have expired, or there
may be inconsistent files detected. This would be the case if
the user modified a file while disconnected and another user
modified the same file on the system.
If the user's tokens have expired during the disconnected
interval, the user must login to the system again to procure
more tokens. Should there be inconsistent files found, the
system puts the files into a covolume space on the server
where the files reside. The user is then expected to decide
the correct vers ion to keep (or merge with the other (s) ) .
While this is not a very elegant way of handling coherence
problems, the designers felt that write-sharing between users
in a Unix environment is infrequent enough to allow manual
consistency repair. 4 1 There is a special software tool
which was designed to aid in this consistency repair process.
It has a special interface with Venus allowing the files in
question to be viewed. The files which are superseded can
then be overwritten and the consistent file saved to the
desired directory (subject to authorization constraints).
Directory cons istency resolution is done automatically; no
user intervention is necessary.
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7.4 V Failure Tolerance
As was the case with security protection strategies, V
does not incorporate the highest technology failure prevention
mechanisms. V is not (yet) meant to be a commercial grade
operating system / network. As an experimental prototype (for
all intents and purposes), failures are a part of the learning
process. More is learned by how a network fails than is
learned by it operating correctly all of the time. There are
some failure tolerance mechanisms in place, however.
As in the other networks surveyed, object replication is
a standard feature. The mechanisms for object location in
case of server failure was explained above in the directory
section. This rebinding to another object manager is also
done when an object is migrated (moved) onto another machine.
When an exception is raised while an application is
running, the V system has an unusual way of handling it.
Every running program has an exception handler which is
registered with the kernel. If the program is actively being
debugged, the debugger is the exception handler. If not, the
handler, usually the team server (explained in the process
management section below), loads the debugger and then hands
the exception off to it along with the state information of
the program which had the exception. The user then can handle
the problem directly. This will probably not be a part of the
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final design -- it would probably be of limited utility in a
non-programming environment.
As this system matures the failure handling facilities
will have to mature with it.
7.5 Failure Tolerance Comparisons
Replication of services is the main failure tolerance
mechanism in these systems. Once again, the V system cannot
be compared to Amoeba and Andrew. Since the system is not yet
ready for commercial release, the failure handling mechanisms
have not yet been developed.
The use of portable computers is a growing phenomenon in
the academic and research domain. Combining failure tolerance
with the mechanism allowing portable computer connection is an
intelligent design decision in the Andrew system. The use of
file caching on the user's hard disk, along with the mech-
anisms for reconciling inconsistent files makes Andrew the
superior system when it comes to providing the user with
uninterrupted service in case of failures.
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8. RPe MEeHANISMS
At the heart of any network is a mechanism for tying the
various remote systems together. Since the nodes of a network
are physically separated, there is no shared memory space.
This separation makes the familiar local procedure call scheme
extremely difficult to implement.
When a local procedure is called, arguments are passed to
the procedure body in the form of parameters. These arguments
may be copies of the memory values in the program (value
parameters) or they may be addresses where the data may be
found (reference parameters). The data passed in is used in
the execution of the procedure body. While the procedure
executes, the main program is blocked (not running). Once the
procedure ends, the value (s) to be returned (if any) are
placed in a shared memory address for the program to find.
The program is then restarted and it continues to execute.
The main problem with remote procedures in distributed
systems is that there is no shared memory in which the
arguments can be passed. All arguments have to be sent by the
communications system to the remote location where the
procedure is to be executed. This fact precludes any pass by
reference parameters as now understood, and makes even value
parameters more complicated.
An RPC is a mechanism for requesting a service from a
remote machine. The main benef it of us ing RPCs is the
89
abstraction which they allow a programmer to use. Without
them, every time a remote service was required, the client
would have to deal with communications protocols, server
idiosyncracies and other low level problems. For example, in
a Unix operating system, the user could conceivably have to
manipulate sockets and communication ports to send a message.
(S)he could use remote shell (rsh) to perform a function on a
remote machine, then receive the data back with the socket
mechanism. Contrast the complications inherent in using a
remote shell with the ability to abstract away all the detail
and simply call a seemingly local procedure as if it were
written right into the same program. The transparency of the










Figure 13 iPe Sequence of Events
As indicated, the RPC is called as a regular procedure
would be. The underlying layers of the mechanism take care of
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the low level details necessary to connect to a remote
machine, perform a service, and return the required data. As
can be seen in figure 13, the calling process blocks while the
RPC is being executed. This is the same sequence that a local
procedure takes the thread of control passes to the
procedure and the main part of the program blocks. The time
required to perform an RPC is the time required to marshall
the arguments (prepare them in a way so that they can be
transmitted on the communication system) to be sent to the
remote machine, to filter down to the communication link, to
actually move along the link to the remote machine, to go up
the communication layers to the server, to un-marshall the
arguments, to execute the procedure, to marshall the return
data into a return message, and then reverse the path back to
the calling entity.
Due to the overhead and communication costs, a great
deal more time is required for a remote procedure to finish
then for a local one. Various techniques have been designed
to ameliorate some of this delay. Several of the networks
surveyed used different strategies to reduce the operational
delays of the RPCs.
8.2 Sun NFS / RPC
In Unix. there are several different implementations of
remote procedure calls. The one often used in networks as
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already described is the mechanism known as the Sun Hicrosys-
tem Open Network Computing implementation, made up of an RPC
specification and XDR (External Data Representation), a way to
represent data uniformly between disparate machine designs.
The concept of RPCs, as indicated, is to hide the details
of the implementation so that the user is only aware of a
seemingly local procedure call. This abstraction is imple-
mented by the use of stub procedures as originally discussed
by Birrel and Nelson. 42 This is a local procedure which
performs the actions necessary to perform the remote call. To
the user, the stub appears to actually execute the call.
8.2.2 Remote Service
The following steps are taken when an remote service is
needed:
~ The user calls the client stub procedure. This marshalls
4
the arguments to the reques ted remote procedure and
builds one or more messages.
A system call is made to the local operating system to
send the messages to the remote system.
The messages are phys ically transported to the remote
system.
A server stub procedure un-marshalls the arguments (and
may convert the representation if needed).
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The server stub calls a local procedure call to actually
perform the service, pass ing to it the arguments re-:
ceived.
The local procedure ends, passing the server stub the
return values.
The server stub marshalls the return arguments, creating
one or more return messages.
The messages are physically transported back to the
client.
The client stub receives the messages from the local
operating system kernel.
The client stub returns, possibly after converting the
data representation back to the local dialect. 43
The client was totally unaware that this was not a local call
(other than the increased time for execution). Several
details must be considered in the above chain of events.
First, the arguments that are passed to the client stub
must be by value only. Pointer references are not poss ible
because there is no shared address s pace with the remote
system.
Second, the local machine must know where the server is
located (its network address). In this system, all server
processes register with the RPC library so that a function
call can find the correct address.
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The transport protocol can support either UDP or TCP
strategies h , depending on the specific implementation of the
Sun RPC package. Some networks only support UDP. The RPC
abstraction actually does not need to be aware of which is
used as long as there is a way to sequence the messages (for
UDP) so that they can be reconstructed at the destination to
which they are sent.
When using UDP, an RPC request will be re-transmitted a
specific number of times if the message(s) get lost. After
those tries, if the message is not received by the remote
system, an exception is raised and returned to the client
stub.
The libraries necessary to use these RPCs are linked into
the kernel when the system boots.
8.3 Amoeba RPC
Remote Procedure Calls in the Amoeba network consist of
three basic system calls to user level processes:
h UDP, as explained above, is a Datagram protocol. That
is, short, fixed length messages, or datagrams, are sent over
the communications lines to remote nodes. The TCP protocol
means that a virtual connection is made between the two nodes
(much like a telephone hookup). This supports stream com-
munication between the two nodes and guarantees that no data
will be lost. UDP gives no such guarantee.
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do_operation: used by a client to request a service, this
sends a message to the server. The client blocks while
waiting for the return.
get_request: used by the server to announce willingness
to accept messages at a specified port.
send_repl~ used by the server to send a message back to
the client.
Because this implementation is a rather sparse interface
for most programmers, another layer of software, called the
AIL (Amoeba Interface Language) has been built on top of it.
AIL provides programmers a mechanism much like the Unix pipe
and device I/O for programmers to use. 44 The AIL compiler
automatically generates C code to marshall the arguments of
calls into message buffers and then call the transport
mechanism for their delivery (and the reverse). It also
allows data to be delivered directly to buffers in the user
space to eliminate the time required to marshall data.
Before a message can be sent to a server, the correct
server location must be ascertained. The operating system
kernel has a table of servers. When a server executes the
get-request call, its service port number is recorded in the
table. When a client executes a do_operation call, the
capabili ty included in the call compares the service port
field with the table. If there is a server offering that
service available, the server and the client are matched. If
the service port is not already available, the kernel broad-
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casts a locate packet inquiring if there are any outstanding
get----request calls for the port in question. If any remote
servers with that port active are available, they inform the
first server which then records that information for future
reference.
When Amoeba is installed over a WAN, there is a slight
difference in the locate procedure. A server wishing to
eXPQrt its services sends a special message to all domains (a
specified area) where it wants the service available. In each
of those domains, a server agent is created. This agent
executes a get----request using the port number of the original
server and then blocks. When a request comes in, it forwards
the request to the appropriate server. 45
8.4 Andrefi' RPC
The RPC mechanism in the Andrew system does not differ
markedly from that of the Unix system on which it is based.
The bulk transfer protocol has been optimized to allow whole
file transfer. In other cases, the standard RPC library has
been used. In fact, the two are so closely related, that the





To an application, the V system appears as a set of
procedural interfaces which allows user applications access to
the various system services. Each service is a part of the
run time libraries which are linked into the V kernel. When
a procedure is invoked, the operation is almost always carried
out in user address space rather than in the kernel. If the
operation is not local, the kernel-provided communication
system is used to request the service from a remote service
module.
The user process requesting a service performs a Send oper-
ation and then blocks waiting for a reply. The request
corresponds to the RPC frame and the response corresponds to
the return results from an RPC. 47 The server process exe-
cutes a receive call which forces it to block until a message
comes in for it. Once the message comes in from the client,
the server is revived, invokes a procedure to handle the
service, and sends a message back. It then executes another
receive call and blocks again waiting for the next message.
If the server is already executing a process for another
client, the second one is queued until it can be serviced.
When the client executes the send, the call goes to the
local kernel. If the server is located on the local machine.
the kernel traps the call and hands it off to the server. If
the service is remote, the kernel sends the message over the
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communication link through the network IPC (Interprocess
Communication) facility. The invoking client has no way of
determining where the server is actually located, nor does it
matter.
Note that there is only one call to the kernel -- that is
the send call. The client blocks until the return message is
received. This allows low overhead for the system. The
communication protocol is optimized for the thirty-two byte
messages which are the standard size for this network. The
designers have discovered that up to 50% of the communications
traffic consists of these short messages. By optimizing the
system protocols for them, the system can optimize speed. 48
With the short messages can be transmitted an optional
data segment of up to 16 kilobytes. This capability allows
the virtual paging scheme to move large amounts of data as
described in the file server section. The destination for
these large chunks of data is built into the messages, so the
data is transferred directly into the space of the calling
process. When a message is sent, explicit permission is given
for the receiving process to access a specific segment of the
client's address space. Since the message is passed from
process to process (client --) kernel --) network IPC process
--) kernel --) server process --) specialized process spawned
by the server), this system would allow any of the intervening
processes access the client's address space. The security
risk that this implies is obvious. The risk is ameliorated
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somewhat by the power that the operating system kernel holds











Figure 14 TranslJiss ion of standard message
8.5.2 V RPC Performance
As indicated above, the communication operations of the
V system are extremely fast. The main design thrust was to
optimize every facet of the interprocess communication. The
process descriptors for each V process contains a template
message header with some of the fields initialized from the
creation of the process. When a message needs to be sent,
this reduces the overhead of preparing the pacl{et. As
indicated in figure 14, the fixed size (32 byte) message is
transferred from the client, to the processor registers, to
the correct portion of the process descriptor which is then
queued directly for network transmission.
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The elapsed time
for a datagram to be sent is an impressive 0.8 milliseconds on
a SUN-3/75 workstation. Overall performance has been measured
with two SUN-3/75 machines connected by a 10 Mbit Ethernet;
the transfer time figures are given in the following table:
Table 4
Ope.ra tioll TiJre llita Rate
(da ta ill Kbytes) (Ni11 ise<..---onds) (l1bi ts/sec. )
I 0 2.54 0.10 I1 3.93 2. 08
I 4 11.2 2.92
8 I 17.8 3.6812 23.0 4.27
16 I 30.0 4.37
odata is 32 byte message iithout data segment. Other numbers
in first column denote data segment size. These sizes are
indicative of file operations in the Vsystem.
Local access (the server is on the local machine) is quite a
bit faster. A 8 Kbyte request from a local server takes only
2.7 milliseconds to fill (as compared to 17.8 milliseconds for
remote access). While these speeds cannot be compared to the
other networks surveyed due to disparities in machine ar-
chitecture and benchmark tests, they are quite fast. If the
difference in speed between remote and local access for an 8
kbyte block is considered (17.8 - 2.7 = 15.1 milliseconds), it
is faster to access the block remotely from the RAM cache than
it is to get it from a very fast local hard disk. 49 This
level of performance, while impress i ve, is the subject of




The design of the RPCs used in a network can have great
control over the speed of execution of network functions.
However, in Andrew and Amoeba, the main speed gains are from
areas other than the RPCs. In Andrew, the bas ic Unix RPCs
were judged sufficient for the network's requirements. Andrew
was intended to be quite compatible with Unix; as such, this
was an intelligent des ign decis ion. The RPCs which were
introduced in the BSD Unix are very efficient and quite fast
on their own. Amoeba, which is not based on Unix, was
designed with a simple RPC interface and a special compiler to
ease the use of them.
The V system owes much of its speed to the highly
optimized communication / RPC implementation. By letting all
calls be routed through the kernel, V speeds up all remote
calls while imposing only a slight penalty on local calls.
The designers of V spent much time researching the way that a
network is actually used and used those findings to optimize
communications. The us e of v irtua 1 memory, although deni-
grated by the Amoeba and Andrew systems has given V the
ability to transfer large amounts of data quite efficiently.
For these and other reasons, the V system is probably the most
efficient of the systems for communication and RPC use.
One of the reasons that the communication system of V can
be so optimized is that scalability was not a primary factor
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in the design of V. The other two networks did have large
network size as a principle goal of their design. This facet
of the networks will be covered in the next chapter.
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9. SCALABILITY
A network is a set of nodes physically dispersed over a
finite area. There is nothing in the definition which limits
the possible size of the system. Until recently, the limiting
factor on network size was the amount of overhead with which
the servers and the communication system could handle.
the system added more than a certain number of nodes,
speed and failure rate suffered adversely. Two of





possible number of nodes which can be added.
The term scalability refers to the ability to connect an
increas ing number of nodes to a network without adversely
affecting the operation or time constraints of the system.
The generalized Unix network which has been discussed in this
thesis is not considered highly scalable. The unbounded
addi tion of nodes to an NFS system results in appreciable
degradation of the network. This degradation is due to the
increase of communication traffic over the physical layer as
indicated above.
9.2 Scalability in Amoeba
Scalability was one of the main reasons that Amoeba was
created. Unlike other networks, the designers of Amoeba
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wanted to include both local and wide area scalability into
the system. Most other networks are designed for the nodes to
be operated within relatively close proximity of each other to
reduce message transit time. Amoeba was envisioned as a
continent wide system from the start. For this reason,
gateways are an integral part of the design. A single,
uniform, large system which is widely dispersed is a logical
evolution for networks. Important to this scheme, however, is
that RPC speed not be compromised on the local level.
Domain C
Domain B
Figure 15 Acoeba SystelJ flUh lfultiple Docains
As illustrated in figure 15, an Amoeba system network can
be divided into domains, a domain being a collection of LANs
which are connected with each other. This conf iguration is
somewhat similar to an Internetwork. A node broadcasting in
a domain sends to all of the other nodes, but to none outside
the domain. Hhen a server agent is created (see RPC section) ,
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it is for such a domain. The server agent handles the wide
dispersal of the message. Note that inter-domain message
takes longer to transit the system than a local message -- it
is still, however, transparent to the user.
The new release of Amoeba (5.0) has redesigned the
internetwork communications protocol to speed up the time
necessary for domains to communicate with each other. This
protocol, called the FLIP (Fast Local Internet Protocol), will
increase already excellent performance and scalability.
The speed of communication in Amoeba guarantees that
large numbers of machines will not degrade the system's
performance. Interprocess throughput of over 800 kbytes /
second ensures that processes will not wait for long periods
of time for access to the communications lines. It should be
noted that the banks of processors which execute the users'
programs must be increased when the number of users increases.
Since the processors are little more than bare board com-
puters, this is not a major expense.
Efforts have been made to ensure that the operating
system kernel be kept as small as possible, keeping as much of
the system in user space as possible. This helps speed up the









kernel" contrasts sharply with the massive kernel implemen-
tation of the Unix system.
105
9.3 Scalabili~y in Andrew
Andrew, even more than Amoeba, was designed for high
scalability. All facets of its operation have been designed
with the idea of eventually connecting up to 10,000 worksta-
tions to a single network. File and directory caching is the
key to scalability in Andrew. Since only open and close calls
actually involve the network, the communications path is
rarely involved in file operations. Less communication
traffic generated by one workstation means more nodes can be
connected.
Clients dynamically determine the location of servers and
cache the that information. Once a file is cached on the
local disk, it is assumed that the files are consistent unless
explicitly notified by a callback. Directory updates are
disseminated by the client's workstation. In every possible
way, the client workstation uses its own processor cycles
instead of server cycles. This strategy increases the number
of users which can be handled by each single server. Similar-
ly. all server updates are multicast for best communication
efficiency. Wherever possible, system states are determined
dynamically. There are very few static bindings which require
atomic, systemwide updates for Andrew to function correctly,
limiting possible damage caused by the crash of servers, and
making the system more robust.
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Adding new workstations simply involves physical connec-
tion to the communication lines and assignment of a network
address. Since the workstations are considered untrusted, no
other ,security measures need to be taken. The system, using
encrypted authorization passwords to disperse validation
tokens takes care of the security. Backup is needed only on
the servers. The replication scheme protects individual
files. Users' hard disks never need backup since they are
only used as caches anyway. Since the number of servers is
small compared to clients, a small staff can run the entire
network. 50
Andrew is broken down into cells in the same way that a
large Amoeba system is split into domains. The decomposition
of the large network into smaller units allows for more
efficient function of the units. The system still allows a
seamless file space despite the partitioning.
9_ 4 Scalabili ty in V
Scalability was not directly addressed by the designers
of V. This, once again. appears to be a function of the
prototype character of the system. There does not appear to
be anyone feature which would limit the amount of nodes which
could be connected up to this network. The amount of com-
munication traffic would appear to be the major limiting
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factor. With the high speed communications of V, that should
lead to a fairly high scalability capability.
The basic system is designed for a cluster of work-
stations, exact size unspecified.
,-
There do not appear to be
any plans for specialized components to enable WAN hookup as
in the Amoeba system.
9.5 Scalability Comparisons
The designers of Andrew and Amoeba have both been able to
achieve high scalability in their systems, although they have
both taken different approaches to the problem. Andrew tries
to keep as many operating system cycles on the users' CPUs in
order to keep Vice system cycles to a minimum. The approach
favored by Amoeba, where almost no cycles are utilized by the
users' own CPUs could not be more different. Where Andrew
tries to minimize the hardware used by the system overhead,
Amoeba adds more servers and processors to handle the extra
traffic caused by upwardly scaling the system. While the cost
of the Amoeba would tend to rise faster, the performance also
should increase with scaling. This leaves the standard "price
vs. performance" decision to the purchaser of the network.
The des igners of the V system, once again, have not
explicitly addressed the scalability issue, so the scalability
of V is problematic. The division of processes into tasks and
















o Scalabili~y Both Amoeba and Andrew are highly scalable
architectures, with no specific upper limit of connectivity.
Each can be connected in both LAN and WAN configurations with
li ttle loss of eff iciency. Each was des igned to reduce the
cost overhead associated with high scalability. The V system
could not be evaluated for this particular feature at the
present time due to its s till experimental status at the
present time.
o Resource Sharing With the exception of processor
capability , each network met this criteria. When processor
resources are considered, the Amoeba system is by far the
superior system, allowing multiple processors to be assigned
to each user as his/her needs fluctuate. V allows processors
to be shared in some circumstances, but is not comparable to
the Amoeba system in supporting true parallel execution of
user programs. Due to its des ign, Andrew actually exacts a
small CPU efficiency penalty from its users, since they must
share their processor with the operating system functions in
many cases.
~ Security Once again V could not be fairly evaluated in
this category due to its experimental nature. Amoeba is more
secure than Andrew with its encryption scheme using one way
functions. Andrew owes its security to physical isolation of
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the dedicated servers; perhaps not as fool-proof as the Amoeba
strategy.
¢ Fault Tolerance: Each network supports replication of
critical resources to prevent total network collapse in case
of failure. The edge in this category must go to Andrew due
to its ability to keep a user running even if the entire
network did fail. As V is not totally complete yet, it cannot
be fairly judged in this category. There is nothing to
indicate, however, that the designers of V are planning on
implementing any further mechanisms_ which will allow it to
compete with Andrew in this category.
~ Failure Recovery This category can be viewed much the
same way as the previous one for many of the same reasons.
With the exception of the manual reconciling of inconsistent
files, Andrew probably does a better job of recovering from a
failure than do the other networks. V may have a slightly
worse problem with recovery since it is not a stateless
network. An inopportune failure during certain non-atomic
operations can conceivably cause complications when recovering
from a failure.
figurations.
Both Amoeba and Andrew use stateless con-
Flexibility This is certainly a nebulous category. The
Amoeba system encourages parallel processing and incorporates
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dynamic load leveling mechanisms. V allows parallel proces-
sing in certain circumstances while Andrew does not support it
at all. On the other hand, Andrew allows portable computer
connection which the other networks do not. V allows rapid
reconfiguration (by changing server processes), while the
other two are mainly statically configured.
All three of these networks are an improvement over the
NFS network. Of the three, perhaps V has the most unanswered
questions; this is to be expected with what is still basically
a prototype. As stated earlier in this thesis: perhaps the
ideal network will include features of all of these systems.




AFS: Andrew File System
AIL: Amoeba Interface Language
AVSG: Accessible Volume Storage Group
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
FID: File Identification
FLIP: Fast Local Internet Protocol
IP: Internet Protocol
IPC: Interprocess Communication
ISO: International Standards Organization
LAN: Local Area Network
LRU: Least Recently Used
NFS: Network File Service
OSI: Open Systems Interconnection
PID: Personal Identification
RAM: Random Access Memory
RPC: Remote Procedure Call
UDP: User Datagram Protocol/Unreliable Datagram Protocol
UI/O: Uniform Input / Output
VFN: Virtual File Node
VFS: Virtual File System
VSG: Volume Storage Group
WAN: Wide Area Network
XDR: External Data Representation
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